06.29.08

Hersh: Bush Admin in “Major Escalation” of Covert Ops Against Iran

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 4:53 pm by Spencer

The July 7-14 issue of The New Yorker includes a major new piece by Seymour Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield” (already available in its entirety online), which reveals that late in 2007…

…Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, …are designed to destabilize the country’s religious leadership. The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. They also include gathering intelligence about Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons program.

Clandestine operations against Iran are not new. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since last year. These have included seizing members of Al Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, and the pursuit of “high-value targets” in the President’s war on terror, who may be captured or killed. But the scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials. Many of these activities are not specified in the new Finding, and some congressional leaders have had serious questions about their nature.

Meanwhile, there has been mounting pressure within the Bush Administration for a military strike against Iran, the extent of which is unclear but various accounts and recent developments suggest it would be a major one.

Military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon share the White House’s concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but there is disagreement about whether a military strike is the right solution.

…The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman is Admiral Mike Mullen, were “pushing back very hard” against White House pressure to undertake a military strike against Iran, the person familiar with the Finding told me. Similarly, a Pentagon consultant who is involved in the war on terror said that “at least ten senior flag and general officers, including combatant commanders” — the four-star officers who direct military operations around the world — “have weighed in on that issue.”

The most outspoken of those officers is Admiral William Fallon, who until recently was the head of U.S. Central Command, and thus in charge of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March [2008], Fallon resigned under pressure, after giving a series of interviews stating his reservations about an armed attack on Iran.

Read the latest article online. For further context, see also Hersh’s earlier reporting for The New Yorker on the Bush Administration’s covert policies viz. Iran:

“The Next Act” (Nov. 27, 2006) — The debate within the Bush Administration over the extent of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and how best to counter it.

“The Redirection” (March 5, 2007) — A major policy shift, or “redirection,” in the Bush Administration’s Middle East strategy. The redirection has brought the U.S. closer to an open confrontation with Iran and propelled it into the sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

“Shifting Targets” (Oct. 8, 2007) — The Bush Administration’s shifting policy toward Iran and the Pentagon’s preparations for possible “surgical strikes” against key Iranian targets. Hersh discusses how the Bush Administration is seeking to redefine the war in Iraq as a strategic battle between the United States and Iran.

08.26.07

Interview with National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, ELINT, Covert Action, Politics at 12:06 am by Spencer

This week the El Paso Times ran a rare on the record interview with Mike McConnell. As the current National Intelligence Director, he is responsible for coordinating the entire US intelligence community (previously the job of the director of the CIA).

A complete transcript of the interview was published on the El Paso Times web site, and this is archived below.  Though a couple passages read a little incoherently, remember that this is a raw transcript of an actual conversation.  It also could’ve used one more pass by a copy editor.

Transcript: Debate on the foreign intelligence surveillance act
By Chris Roberts
El Paso Times (Texas), August 22, 2007
http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_6685679

The following is the transcript of a question and answer session with National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell.

Question: How much has President Bush or members of his administration formed your response to the FISA debate?

Answer: Not at all. When I came back in, remember my previous assignment was director of the NSA, so this was an area I have known a little bit about. So I came back in. I was nominated the first week of January. The administration had made a decision to put the terrorist surveillance program into the FISA court. I think that happened the 7th of Jan. So as I come in the door and I’m prepping for the hearings, this sort of all happened. So the first thing I want to know is what’s this program and what’s the background and I was pretty surprised at what I learned. First off, the issue was the technology had changed and we had worked ourselves into a position that we were focusing on foreign terrorist communications, and this was a terrorist foreigner in a foreign country. The issue was international communications are on a wire so all of a sudden we were in a position because of the wording in the law that we had to have a warrant to do that. So the most important thing to capture is that it’s a foreigner in a foreign country, required to get a warrant. Now if it were wireless, we would not be required to get a warrant. Plus we were limited in what we were doing to terrorism only and the last time I checked we had a mission called foreign intelligence, which should be construed to mean anything of a foreign intelligence interest, North Korea, China, Russia, Syria, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, military development and it goes on and on and on. So when I engaged with the administration, I said we’ve gotten ourselves into a position here where we need to clarify, so the FISA issue had been debated and legislation had been passed in the house in 2006, did not pass the Senate. Two bills were introduced in the Senate, I don’t know if it was co-sponsorship or two different bills, but Sen. (Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.) had a bill and Sen. Specter had a bill and it may have been the same bill, I don’t know, but the point is a lot of debate, a lot of dialogue. So, it was submitted to the FISA court and the first ruling in the FISA court was what we needed to do we could do with an approval process that was at a summary level and that was OK, we stayed in business and we’re doing our mission. Well in the FISA process, you may or may not be aware …

Q: When you say summary level, do you mean the FISA court?

A: The FISA court. The FISA court ruled presented the program to them and they said the program is what you say it is and it’s appropriate and it’s legitimate, it’s not an issue and was had approval. But the FISA process has a renewal. It comes up every so many days and there are 11 FISA judges. So the second judge looked at the same data and said well wait a minute I interpret the law, which is the FISA law, differently. And it came down to, if it’s on a wire and it’s foreign in a foreign country, you have to have a warrant and so we found ourselves in a position of actually losing ground because it was the first review was less capability, we got a stay and that took us to the 31st of May. After the 31st of May we were in extremis because now we have significantly less capability. And meantime, the community, before I came back, had been working on a National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threat to the homeland. And the key elements of the terrorist threat to the homeland, there were four key elements, a resilient determined adversary with senior leadership willing to die for the cause, requiring a place to train and develop, think of it as safe haven, they had discovered that in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now the Pakistani government is pushing and pressing and attempting to do something about it, but by and large they have areas of safe haven. So leadership that can adapt, safe haven, intermediate leadership, these are think of them as trainers, facilitators, operational control guys. And the fourth part is recruits. They have them, they’ve taken them. This area is referred to as the FATA, federally administered tribal areas, they have the recruits and now the objective is to get them into the United States for mass casualties to conduct terrorist operations to achieve mass casualties. All of those four parts have been carried out except the fourth. They have em, but they haven’t been successful. One of the major tools for us to keep them out is the FISA program, a significant tool and we’re going the wrong direction. So, for me it was extremis to start talking not only to the administration, but to members of the hill. So from June until the bill was passed, I think I talked to probably 260 members, senators and congressmen. We submitted the bill in April, had an open hearing 1 May, we had a closed hearing in May, I don’t remember the exact date. Chairman (U.S. Rep. Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas) had two hearings and I had a chance to brief the judiciary committee in the house, the intelligence committee in the house and I just mentioned the Senate, did not brief the full judiciary committee in the Senate, but I did meet with Sen. (Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.) and Sen. (Arlen Specter, R-Pa.), and I did have an opportunity on the Senate side, they have a tradition there of every quarter they invite the director of national intelligence in to talk to them update them on topics of interest. And that happened in (June 27). Well what they wanted to hear about was Iraq and Afghanistan and for whatever reason, I’m giving them my review and they ask questions in the order in which they arrive in the room. The second question was on FISA, so it gave me an opportunity to, here I am worrying about this problem and I have 41 senators and I said several things. The current threat is increasing, I’m worried about it. Our capability is decreasing and let me explain the problem.

Q: Can’t you get the warrant after the fact?

A: The issue is volume and time. Think about foreign intelligence. What it presented me with an opportunity is to make the case for something current, but what I was really also trying to put a strong emphasis on is the need to do foreign intelligence in any context. My argument was that the intelligence community should not be restricted when we are conducting foreign surveillance against a foreigner in a foreign country, just by dint of the fact that it happened to touch a wire. We haven’t done that in wireless for years.

Q: So you end up with people tied up doing paperwork?

A: It takes about 200 man hours to do one telephone number. Think about it from the judges standpoint. Well, is this foreign intelligence? Well how do you know it’s foreign intelligence? Well what does Abdul calling Mohammed mean, and how do I interpret that? So, it’s a very complex process, so now, I’ve got people speaking Urdu and Farsi and, you know, whatever, Arabic, pull them off the line have them go through this process to justify what it is they know and why and so on. And now you’ve got to write it all up and it goes through the signature process, take it through (the Justice Department), and take it down to the FISA court. So all that process is about 200 man hours for one number. We’re going backwards, we couldn’t keep up. So the issue was …

Q: How many calls? Thousands?

A: Don’t want to go there. Just think, lots. Too many. Now the second part of the issue was under the president’s program, the terrorist surveillance program, the private sector had assisted us. Because if you’re going to get access you’ve got to have a partner and they were being sued. Now if you play out the suits at the value they’re claimed, it would bankrupt these companies. So my position was we have to provide liability protection to these private sector entities. So that was part of the request. So we went through that and we argued it. Some wanted to limit us to terrorism. My argument was, wait a minute, why would I want to limit it to terrorism. It may be that terrorists are achieving weapons of mass destruction, the only way I would know that is if I’m doing foreign intelligence by who might be providing a weapon of mass destruction.

Q: And this is still all foreign to foreign communication?

A: All foreign to foreign. So, in the final analysis, I was after three points, no warrant for a foreigner overseas, a foreign intelligence target located overseas, liability protection for the private sector and the third point was we must be required to have a warrant for surveillance against a U.S. person. And when I say U.S. person I want to make sure you capture what that means. That does not mean citizen. That means a foreigner, who is here, we still have to have a warrant because he’s here. My view is that that’s the right check and balances and it’s the right protection for the country and lets us still do our mission for protection of the country. And we’re trying to fend off foreign threats.

Q: So are you satisfied with it the way it is now?

A: I am. The issue that we did not address, which has to be addressed is the liability protection for the private sector now is proscriptive, meaning going forward. We’ve got a retroactive problem. When I went through and briefed the various senators and congressmen, the issue was alright, look, we don’t want to work that right now, it’s too hard because we want to find out about some issues of the past. So what I recommended to the administration is, ‘Let’s take that off the table for now and take it up when Congress reconvenes in September.’

Q: With an eye toward the six-month review?

A: No, the retroactive liability protection has got to be addressed.

Q: And that’s not in the current law?

A: It is not. Now people have said that I negotiated in bad faith, or I did not keep my word or whatever…

Q: That you had an agenda that you weren’t honest about.

A: I’ll give you the facts from my point of view. When I checked on board I had my discussion with the president. I’m an apolitical figure. I’m not a Republican, I’m not a Democrat. I have voted for both. My job is as a professional to try to do this job the best way I can in terms of, from the intelligence community, protect the nation. So I made my argument that we should have the ability to do surveillance the same way we’ve done it for the past 50 years and not be inhibited when it’s a foreigner in a foreign country. The president’s guidance to me early in the process, was, ‘You’ve got the experience. I trust your judgement. You make the right call. There’s no pressure from anybody here to tell you how to do it. He did that early. He revisited with me in June. He did it again in July and he said it publicly on Friday before the bill was passed. We were at the FBI, it’s an annual thing, we go to the FBI and do a homeland security kind of update. So he came out at noon and said, ‘I’m requesting that Congress pass this bill. It’s essential. Do it before you go on recess. I’m depending on Mike McConnell’s recommendations. And that was the total sum and substance of the guidance and the involvement from the White House with regard to how I should make the call. Now, as we negotiated, we started with 66 pages, were trying to get everything cleaned up at once. When I reduced it to my three points, we went from 66 pages to 11. Now, this is a very, very complex bill. I had a team of 20 lawyers working. You can change a word in a paragraph and end up with some major catastrophe down in paragraph 27, subsection 2c, to shut yourself down, you’ll be out of business. So when we send up our 11 pages, we had a lot of help in making sure we got it just right so it would come back and we’d say wait a minute we can’t live with this or one of the lawyers would say, ‘Wait we tried that, it won’t work, here’s the problem.’ So we kept going back and forth, so we sent up a version like Monday, we sent up a version on Wednesday, we sent up a version on Thursday. The House leadership, or the Democratic leadership on Thursday took that bill and we talked about it. And my response was there are some things I can’t live with in this bill and they said alright we’re going to fix them. Now, here’s the issue. I never then had a chance to read it for the fix because, again, it’s so complex, if you change a word or phrase, or even a paragraph reference, you can cause unintended …

Q: You have to make sure it’s all consistent?

A: Right. So I can’t agree to it until it’s in writing and my 20 lawyers, who have been doing this for two years, can work through it. So in the final analysis, I was put in the position of making a call on something I hadn’t read. So when it came down to crunch time, we got a copy and it had some of the offending language back in it. So I said, ‘I can’t support it.’ And it played out in the House the way it played out in the House. Meantime on the Senate side, there were two versions being looked at. The Wednesday version and the Thursday version. And one side took one version and the other side took the other version. The Thursday version, we had some help, and I didn’t get a chance to review it. So now, it’s Friday night, the Senate’s voting. They were having their debate and I still had not had a chance to review it. So, I walked over, I was up visiting some senators trying to explain some of the background. So I walked over to the chamber and as I walked into the office just off the chamber, it’s the vice president’s office, somebody gave me a copy. So I looked at the version and said, ‘Can’t do it. The same language was back in there.’

Q: What was it?

A: Just let me leave it, not too much detail, there were things with regard to our authorities some language around minimization. So it put us in an untenable position. So then I had another version to take a look at, which was our Wednesday version, which basically was unchanged. So I said, well certainly, I’m going to support that Wednesday version. So that’s what I said and the vote happened in the Senate and that was on Friday. So now it rolled to the House on Saturday. They took up the bill, they had a spirited debate, my name was invoked several times, not in a favorable light in some cases. (laughs) And they took a vote and it passed 226 to 182, I think. So it’s law. The president signed it on Sunday and here we are.

Q: That’s far from unanimous. There’s obviously going to be more debate on this.

A: There are a couple of issues to just be sensitive to. There’s a claim of reverse targeting. Now what that means is we would target somebody in a foreign country who is calling into the United States and our intent is to not go after the bad guy, but to listen to somebody in the United States. That’s not legal, it’s, it would be a breach of the Fourth Amendment. You can go to jail for that sort of thing. And If a foreign bad guy is calling into the United States, if there’s a need to have a warrant, for the person in the United States, you just get a warrant. And so if a terrorist calls in and it’s another terrorist, I think the American public would want us to do surveillance of that U.S. person in this case. So we would just get a warrant and do that. It’s a manageable thing. On the U.S. persons side it’s 100 or less. And then the foreign side, it’s in the thousands. Now there’s a sense that we’re doing massive data mining. In fact, what we’re doing is surgical. A telephone number is surgical. So, if you know what number, you can select it out. So that’s, we’ve got a lot of territory to make up with people believing that we’re doing things we’re not doing.

Q: Even if it’s perception, how do you deal with that? You have to do public relations, I assume.

A: Well, one of the things you do is you talk to reporters. And you give them the facts the best you can. Now part of this is a classified world. The fact we’re doing it this way means that some Americans are going to die, because we do this mission unknown to the bad guys because they’re using a process that we can exploit and the more we talk about it, the more they will go with an alternative means and when they go to an alternative means, remember what I said, a significant portion of what we do, this is not just threats against the United States, this is war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q. So you’re saying that the reporting and the debate in Congress means that some Americans are going to die?

A. That’s what I mean. Because we have made it so public. We used to do these things very differently, but for whatever reason, you know, it’s a democratic process and sunshine’s a good thing. We need to have the debate. The reason that the FISA law was passed in 1978 was an arrangement was worked out between the Congress and the administration, we did not want to allow this community to conduct surveillance, electronic surveillance, of Americans for foreign intelligence unless you had a warrant, so that was required. So there was no warrant required for a foreign target in a foreign land. And so we are trying to get back to what was the intention of ‘78. Now because of the claim, counterclaim, mistrust, suspicion, the only way you could make any progress was to have this debate in an open way.

Q. So you don’t think there was an alternative way to do this?

A. There may have been an alternative way, but we are where are …

Q. A better way, I should say.

A. All of my briefs initially were very classified. But it became apparent that we were not going to be able to carry the day if we don’t talk to more people.

Q. Some might say that’s the price you pay for living in a free society. Do you think that this is necessary that these Americans die?

A. We could have gotten there a different way. We conducted intelligence since World War II and we’ve maintained a sensitivity as far as sources and methods. It’s basically a sources and methods argument. If you don’t protect sources and methods then those you target will choose alternative means, different paths. As it is today al-Qaida in Iraq is targeting Americans, specifically the coalition. There are activities supported by other nations to import electronic, or explosively formed projectiles, to do these roadside attacks and what we know about that is often out of very sensitive sources and methods. So the more public it is, then they take it away from us. So that’s the tradeoff.

DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Q: I wanted to ask you about the diversity question. This has major ramifications here, we have this center of excellence program that’s recruiting high school kids, many of whom wouldn’t qualify if first generation American citizens weren’t allowed.

A: So you agree with me?

Q: It does sound like something that would benefit this area that would also allow you to get people from here who are bicultural and have an openness to seeing things …

A: You’re talking about Hispanics?

Q: Yes.

A: Hispanics are probably the most under-represented group if you think of America, what the ethic makeup of America, Hispanics are the most under-represented group in my community. Now, that said, and should increase that Hispanic population and programs like this will do that. That’s why the outreach. But also we need, particularly with the current problem of terrorism, we need to have speakers of Urdu and Farsi and Arabic and people from those cultures that understand the issues of tribes and clans and all the things that go with understanding that part of the world. Varying religions and so on. Because it is, it’s almost impossible, I’ve had the chance to live in the Middle East for years, I’ve studied it for years, it’s impossible to understand it without having some feel for the culture and so on. So while I’m all for increasing the diversity along the lines we talked about, I’m also very much in favor of first generation Americans from the countries that are causing issues and problems.

Q: What is the status of that program.

A: It is not in statue. It is not in policy. It has been habit. So we’ve stated, as a matter of policy, that we’re not going to abide by those habits.

Q: And that’s already the case?

A: Yes, and are we making progress? Not fast enough, but we will make progress over time.

Q: How do you measure that?

A: Very simple, you get to measure what are you and where are you trying go and are you making progress. I wrestled with this years ago when I was NSA ….

Q: You don’t want quotas, though?

A: Quotas are forbidden so we set goals. My way of thinking about it is what is your end state? Now some would say that federal governments should look like America, whatever that is. OK, that sounded like a reasonable metric, so I said, ‘Alright, what does America look like?’ So I got a bunch of numbers. I said, ‘Alright, what do we look like?’ and it didn’t match, and as I just told you, the one place where there’s the greatest mismatch is Hispanic. It’s much closer, as matter of fact, people would be surprised how close it is across, at least my community among the other minorities. Now, that said, numbers don’t necessarily equal positioning in the organization. So that’s another feature we have to work on, is placement of women and minorities in leadership positions.

Q: So, you’re quantifying that as well?

A: Yes.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY ON THE NATION’S SOUTHWEST BORDER

Q: There seems to be very little terrorist-related activity on the Southwest border, which is watched very closely because of the illegal immigration issue. Can you talk about why it’s important to be alert here?

A: Let me go back to my NIE, those are unclassified key judgements, pull them down and look at them. You’ve got committed leadership. You’ve got a place to train. They’ve got trainers and they’ve got recruits. The key now is getting recruits in. So if the key is getting recruits in. So, if you’re key is getting recruits in, how would you do that? And so, how would you do that?

Q: I’d go to the northern border where there’s nobody watching.

A: And that’s a path. Flying in is a path. Taking a ship in is a path. Coming up through the Mexican border is a path. Now are they doing it in great numbers, no. Because we’re finding them and we’re identifying them and we’ve got watch lists and we’re keeping them at bay. There are numerous situations where people are alive today because we caught them (terrorists). And my point earlier, we catch them or we prevent them because we’ve got the sources and methods that lets us identify them and do something about it. And you know the more sources and methods are compromised, we have that problem.

Q: And in many cases we don’t hear about them?

A: The vast majority you don’t hear about. Remember, let me give you a way to think about this. If you’ve got an issue, you have three potential outcomes, only three. A diplomatic success, an operational success or an intelligence failure. Because all those diplomatic successes and operations successes where there’s intelligence contribution, it’s not an intelligence success. It’s just part of the process. But if there’s an intelligence failure …

Q: Then you hear about it.

A: So, are terrorists coming across the Southwest border? Not in great numbers.

Q: There are some cases?

A: There are some. And would they use it as a path, given it was available to them? In time they will.

Q: If they’re successful at it, then they’ll probably repeat it.

A: Sure. There were a significant number of Iraqis who came across last year. Smuggled across illegally.

Q: Where was that?

A: Across the Southwest border.

Q: Can you give me anymore detail?

A: I probably could if I had my notebook. It’s significant numbers. I’ll have somebody get it for you. I don’t remember what it is.

Q: The point is it went from a number to (triple) in a single year, because they figured it out. Now some we caught, some we didn’t. The ones that get in, what are they going to do? They’re going to write home. So, it’s not rocket science, word will move around. There’s a program now in South America, where you can, once you’re in South American countries, you can move around in South America and Central America without a visa. So you get a forged passport in Lebanon or where ever that gets you to South America. Now, no visa, you can move around, and with you’re forged passport, as a citizen of whatever, you could come across that border. So, what I’m highlighting is that something …

Q: Is this how it happened, the cases you’re talking about?

A: Yes.

03.09.07

Crazy But True: Al Qaida Penetrated CIA, FBI, & Special Forces Ahead of 9/11

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 12:27 am by Spencer

Little noticed at the time, less than two months after the 9/11 attack, was a positively jaw-dropping story in the San Francisco Chronicle which revealed:

A former U.S. Army sergeant who trained Osama bin Laden’s bodyguards and helped plan the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya was a U.S. government informant during much of his terrorist career, according to [US government] sources familiar with his case.

…[Ali] Mohamed, 49 [in 2001], is a former Egyptian Army major, fluent in Arabic and English, who after his arrest became known as bin Laden’s “California connection.” Last year [in 2000], when he pleaded guilty in the embassy bombing case, he told a federal judge that he first was drawn to terrorism in 1981, when he joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a fundamentalist group implicated in that year’s assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

For almost as long as he was a terrorist, Mohamed also was in contact with U.S. intelligence, according to court records and sources.

In 1984, he quit the Egyptian Army to work as a counterterrorism security expert for EgyptAir. After that, he offered to become a CIA informant, said the U.S. government official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“The agency tried him out, but because he told other possible terrorists or people possibly associated with terrorist groups that he was working for the CIA, clearly he was not suitable,” the official said.

The CIA cut off contact with Mohamed and put his name on a “watch list” aimed at blocking his entrance to the United States, according to the official.

Nevertheless, Mohamed got a visa one year later. He ultimately became a U.S. citizen after marrying a Santa Clara woman. In 1986, he joined the U.S. Army as an enlisted man. He was posted to Fort Bragg, N.C., home of the elite Special Forces.

There he worked as a supply sergeant for a Green Beret unit, then as an instructor on Middle Eastern affairs in the John F. Kennedy special warfare school.

…In 1989, Mohamed left the Army and returned to Santa Clara, where he worked as a security guard and at a home computer business.

Between then and his 1998 arrest, he said in court last year, Mohamed was deeply involved in bin Laden’s al Qaeda. He spent months abroad, training bin Laden’s fighters in camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. While in Africa, he scouted the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, target of the 1998 bombing. In this country, he helped al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s top aide, enter the country with a fake passport and tour U.S. mosques, raising money later funneled to al Qaeda.

According to Steven Emerson, a terrorism expert and author who has written about the case, Mohamed by the early 1990s had also established himself as an FBI informant.

“He agreed to serve (the FBI) and provide information, but in fact he was working for the bad guys and insulating himself from scrutiny from other law enforcement agencies,” Emerson said in an interview.

One particularly troubling aspect of the case, Emerson says, was that Mohamed’s role as an FBI informant gave bin Laden important insights into U.S. efforts to penetrate al Qaeda.

…In 1993, [a 1998 FBI] affidavit says, Mohamed was questioned by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police after a bin Laden aide was caught trying to enter the United States with Mohamed’s driver’s license and a false passport.

Mohamed acknowledged traveling to Vancouver to help the terrorist sneak into the United States and admitted working closely with bin Laden’s group. Yet he was so unconcerned about being arrested that he told the Mounties he hoped the interview wouldn’t hurt his chances of getting a job as an FBI interpreter.

(According to the affidavit, he had indeed applied for the FBI position but never got it.)

Later that year, Mohamed — again seemingly without concern for consequences — told the FBI that he had trained bin Laden followers in intelligence and anti-hijacking techniques in Afghanistan, the affidavit says.

In January 1995, Mohamed applied for a U.S. security clearance, in hopes of becoming a security guard with a Santa Clara defense contractor. His application failed to mention ever traveling to Pakistan or Afghanistan, trips he had told the FBI about earlier. In three interviews with Defense Department officials, who conducted a background check on him, he claimed he had never been a terrorist.

“I have never belonged to a terrorist organization, but I have been approached by organizations that could be called terrorist,” he told the interviewers.

According to the affidavit, he told FBI agents in 1997 that he had trained bin Laden’s bodyguards, saying he loved bin Laden and believed in him. Mohamed also said it was “obvious” that the United States was the enemy of Muslim people.

“I think you or I would have a better chance of winning Powerball (a lottery), than an Egyptian major in the unit that assassinated Sadat would have getting a [US] visa, getting to California…getting into the Army and getting assigned to a Special Forces unit,” [Lt. Col. Robert Anderson, Mohamed’s former commanding officer at Ft. Bragg] said. “That just doesn’t happen. “

Well…except it did. And more than five years later, most folks have no idea about it.

Ali Mohamed and his role as an Al Qaida mole within the US intelligence infrastructure is the subject of Triple Cross, a mammoth new book by Emmy Award-winning investigative journalist Peter Lance. I’ve not read the book (I’m waiting for the paperback edition, which I suspect will be revised and updated to whatever extent), so I can’t offer an opinion about it. But I’ve read portions of his two previous books related to 9/11 — 1,000 Years for Revenge and Cover Up: What the Government is Still Hiding About the War on Terror — and I would say that while he sometimes evinces a slight lean to the sensational and not-so-well-written (which I take to be a shadow of his broadcast journalism background), he’s not the conspiracy nut one might initially take him for. He digs up very interesting information and raises very pointed — and eminently relevant — questions.

Meanwhile, I recommend checking out this recent Metafilter post about Mohamed, which include numerous worthwhile relevant links. Also, this November 2006 Democracy Now! interview with Lance is worth absorbing.

Last summer, the National Geographic Channel aired a documentary based on Triple Cross. I have not seen it, but apparently Mr. Lance was pretty ticked off about the final product, saying it omitted the most important part of the story — how exactly Mohammed was allowed to operate with such impunity, and who exactly was apparently involved.

It’s probably obligatory to mention this (unquestionably biased) blog post by Larry C. Johnson, which seeks to discredit Lance and Triple Cross, in part by quoting from (and posting PDFs of) interrogation reports related to one Hakim Murad — whose relevance to the core tale is not made evident and, like I say, since I ain’t read the book I couldn’t tell ya. In this context, it’s worth noting that — in addition to getting very personal and nasty in his follow-up comments — Mr. Johnson beats his breast about a quote by Johnson that Lance apparently falsely cites as appearing in a NY Times op-ed piece on some date or other. In fact, the quote in question definitely does not appear in said cited op-ed piece, and Mr. Johnson thus calls Mr. Lance “a liar” and more than implying that he never uttered such words ever, amen. However, it turns out that Mr. Johnson did in fact utter the quote, which was indeed published in a NY Times article but on a different date and not in an op-ed piece. So while Mr. Lance is rightly chastised for poor citation work, Mr. Johnson’s own demonstrably selective assertions in the matter definitely make one wonder about his own agenda (especially since Mr. Johnson served as a counter-terrorism expert for the current Bush administration).

Piffle and whatever. Ali Mohamed — and just what the US government had to do with him and why — is obviously worth learning much more about.

01.04.07

Can We Impeach This Jerk Yet?

Posted in What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 11:18 pm by Spencer

As reported today on the national wires (“Bush says feds can open mail without warrant,” Seattle Times 4 Jan 07), Congress just passed a law specifically prohibiting the government from opening private mail without a warrant — a judge’s warrant, not an “administrative” one — and on Dec. 20, as Washington shut down for Christmas, President Bush quietly signed it.

BUT.  “He then issued a ’signing statement’ that declared his right to open mail under emergency conditions, contrary to existing law and contradicting the bill he had just signed,” according to the story.  It continues:

Bush said he will “construe” an exception, “which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection in a manner consistent…with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances.”

Bush cited as examples the need to “protect human life and safety against hazardous materials and the need for physical searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence collection.”

Of course, the problem is that “exigent” basically means anything the Bush Administration wants (we are at war, don’t forget) — which is precisely why the outgoing Republican Congress put it in the damn law in the first damn place.

Predictably, the low-level White House flacks sent out are mumbling the “not assuming any new powers” mantra, but national security specialists and officials alike are shocked and concerned.

“The [Bush] signing statement claims authority to open domestic mail without a warrant, and that would be new and quite alarming,” said Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington.

“You have to be concerned,” a senior U.S. official agreed. “It takes executive-branch authority beyond anything we’ve ever known.”

And I’m totally serious about the impeachment thing.  Pending election, my foot.  The man swore a binding oath to “uphold and protect the Constitution.”  I’d say active subversion outranks blowjobs on the indictment scale any day of the week.  I mean, c’mon.
If you haven’t already, read up on this “signing statement” phenomenon and watch for it in the papers.

10.26.06

The Spy In Seattle

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 11:06 pm by Spencer

On Monday, Oct. 23, 2006, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (a sad pale shadow of its former self) ran a front-page, above-the-fold article with large color photo of none other than 1970s CIA figure Edwin P. Wilson.

“Former CIA spy branded a traitor wants to clear his name” by Tracy Johnson is a portrait of Wilson today, released in 2004 from the maximum security prison at Marion, IL, the asshole of the solitary confinement prison system. A Federal judge decreed that the government had knowingly withheld vital evidence damaging to their case and, worse, presented false testimony. Reporter Johnson traces Wilson’s impossible-but-true history, while following him around his Seattle office and his home somewhere around Edmonds.

Surrounded by great stacks of boxed documents, Edwin Wilson seeks to clear his name through lawsuits against individuals in the CIA that he says know the truth about Wilson’s relationship with the Agency. This is an important point, of course, because Wilson was sentenced to national security prison for trading arms with the Libyans, which was indeed a very serious crime at the time. However, Wilson has maintained he was making the deals with the approval and even encouragement of the CIA, in an effort to gain more intelligence inside the network. The US government has always steadfastly disavowed any such sanction. Evidently, the judge in 2004 saw it a little differently.

As I say, Wilson’s story is a complicated one. In addition to the arms trading and espionage, he has also been convicted of paying to hire a hit man to kill a prosecuter and others involved in his case. The key payment to the hit man was actually handed over by one of Wilson’s sons. He, too, was convicted and sentenced to prison, though he was later released. According to Johnson’s account, the two have not been in touch since the trial.
And even that is only the tip of the ice berg.

08.20.06

Col. James Steele Bibliographic Info

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics, History at 4:44 pm by Spencer

As discussed in a previous post, Col. James Steele is currently Counselor to the U.S. Ambassador for Iraqi Security Forces. Some of these forces are known to be involved in death squad activity in Iraq. During the mid-1980s, Col. Steele was assigned to El Salvador, where he led the US Military Advisory Group, commanding special “counter-insurgent” forces at the brigade level.

According to a wide array of evidence, Col. Steele helped direct Salvadoran military death squads and torture, and was involved to some extent in Iran-Contra.
Following are number of bibliographic citations related to Col. Steele, courtesy of Namebase.org.

STEELE JAMES J (COL)
El Salvador 1985-1986
Nicaragua 1986

* Bainerman, J. The Crimes of a President. 1992 (21)
* Castillo, C. Harmon, D. Powderburns. 1994 (151, 164-5, 169-70)
* Christic Institute. Sheehan Affidavit. 1988-03-25 (223-5)
* Cockburn, A. & L. Dangerous Liaison. 1991 (256, 258)
* Cockburn, L. Out of Control. 1987 (223)
* Lobster Magazine (Britain) 1997-#33 (28)
* New Federalist 1994-10-24 (8)
* Parry, R. Lost History. 1997 (59)
* Prados, J. Presidents’ Secret Wars. 1988 (445-6, 451-2, 455)
* Progressive 1987-05 (21)
* Progressive 1988-03 (23)
* Rodriguez, F. Weisman,J. Shadow Warrior. 1989 (225-6, 231, 234-5)
* Sklar, H. Washington’s War on Nicaragua. 1988 (231, 273, 278, 324)
* Tarpley, W.G. Chaitkin,A. George Bush. 1992 (404, 409)
* Walsh, L. Final Iran-Contra Report. Volume III. 1993-12-03 (66-7, 70-1, 75-6)
* Washington Post 1986-10-18 (A14)
* Washington Post 1986-12-05 (A1, 24)
* Washington Post 1989-04-30 (A26, 27)
* Washington Post 1989-06-09 (A36)
* Washington Post 1990-09-30 (A6)
* Washington Post 1991-07-07 (A4)

US Support for Death Squads in Iraq — Some Evidence and a Chronology

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 1:38 pm by Spencer

As the headlines attest, death squad activity in Iraq is not only well-established but escalating. In recent months, hundreds have been killed in Baghdad alone while thousands are believed to have fallen victim throughout Iraq. In July this year, US forces in Baghdad began a well-publicized campaign against the death squads.

The prevailing, shall we say, “mainstream wisdom” about Iraqi death squads runs about as follows (from a July 25, 2006 CNN online report):

Most death squad killings appear to be sectarian, with Sunni Muslim gunmen targeting Shia neighborhoods, and Shiite attackers going after Sunnis. Victims are sometimes abducted by the dozens, their bodies often turning up later with signs of torture.

On Monday [July 24, 2006], three bodies were recovered across Baghdad. All had been shot in the head and showed signs of being brutalized.

Sunni leaders have accused Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government of allowing gunmen from Shiite militias to infiltrate Iraq’s police force, but U.S. troops have not found a “larger organization” behind the killings, Maj. Gen. William Caldwell said.

“It appears it’s very extremist elements from both sides out there operating, using murder and assassination as their means by which to further personal goals that they’re trying to achieve,” he said.

In July, about a month ago, the Pentagon launched a well-publicized counteroffensive against the death squads called, I shit you not, Operation Together Forward. As reported in the Washington Post recently:

The military calls the new battle for Baghdad “Operation Together Forward.” It began about two weeks ago [ca. mid-July 2006], with raids by U.S. and British special operations forces to capture or kill death squad leaders. So far, about 10 have been “taken out,” most of them members of the Mahdi Army, according to administration officials. The operations included a strike by British forces against a Mahdi Army lieutenant who had been terrorizing residents of Basra in southern Iraq.

But there’s a few stones in the proverbial shoe about the whole Iraqi death squad thing, namely a January 2005 Newsweek online article titled ‘The Salvador Option’: The Pentagon may put Special-Forces-led assassination or kidnapping teams in Iraq. It never appeared in Newsweek’s newsstand edition, but the story was picked up by a few international news services and reproduced en masse throughout the blogosphere and, of course, the “leftie net”, where it’s an open and ongoing subject of discussion.

Unspecified but plural “sources” and “officials” inside the Pentagon told Newsweek that consideration was in the advanced stages over employing death squad tactics in Iraq taken from the Salvadoran and other death squad operations run by CIA and the Pentagon during the 1980s. Hence the nickname, The Salvador Option. The conservative elements were said to be strongly in favor and were discussing specifics.

Historically, death squads are special units within the military, secretly directed usually by the internal security service or the interior ministry. All are trained by and ultimately answer to the US usually via CIA, Special Forces, embassy officials with a “special portfolio,” and/or other covert personnel. Senior controllers in Washington DC are generally well — but deniably — briefed on the operations, which are sanctioned (again, secretly) at the highest levels of the US Administration. There is extensive available literature providing ample documentation of the Latin American death squads.

(As an aside, it perhaps bears mentioning that there are in fact some 380 troops and “special forces” from El Salvador’s 4th Cuscatlan Batalion in Iraq, according to 2005 numbers. Not that Salvadorans are the only ones capable of teaching or running death squads. After all, we trained them.)

That article appeared in January 2005. As it happens, a steady upward curve of death squad violence began to appear almost immediately thereafter. By November, only 10 months later, Z Magazine ran an article by Nicolas JS Davies, “The Dirty War in Iraq”, which summarized news accounts of dozens of death squad and similar incidents in Iraq, all within the prior 11 or 12 months. In June 2005, an Iraqi special correspondent for Knight Ridder, Yasser Salihee, who was writing increasingly damaging articles about Iraqi death squads, was shot once through the head by a sniper and killed while stopped at a US/Iraqi-manned checkpoint newly erected near his home.
Recently, Rep. Dennis Kucinich (yes, the former presidential candidate) added a memo to the Congressional Record concerning a letter he sent to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the letter, dated April 5, 2006, Kucinich recites one of the most comprehensive checklists I’ve seen of Iraqi death squad related press revelations and related events within the US and Iraq militaries. He concludes by requesting “a copy of all records pertaining to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise, support and train Iraqi assassination and kidnapping teams. I look forward to receiving your response.” I’m not sure of Rumsfeld’s response if any, but I can imagine.

I can’t vouch for everything in Kucinich’s letter to Rumsfeld, but what I do know jives with how he puts it. The letter makes a lengthy post, but I want it on hand and it’s posted without making endorsement or judgement of Kucinich per se (a discussion for another day). Over time I’ll try to add contextual links to the reports and sources cited.

Letter to Secretary Rumsfeld
Source: www.kucinich.us/floor_speeches/iq_rumsfeld_letter4may.php

Dennis Kucinich speaking from the Floor of the House - Extensions of Remarks
Congressional Record, May 4, 2006

“Mr. Speaker, [on April 5 2006] I sent the following letter to Secretary Rumsfeld requesting records pertaining to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise, support, and train Iraqi death squads:”

Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

April 5, 2006

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am writing to request a copy of all records pertaining to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise, support and train Iraqi assassination and kidnapping teams.

On January 8, 2005, Newsweek magazine first published a report that the Pentagon had a proposal to train elite Iraqi squads to quell the growing Sunni insurgency. The proposal has been called the “Salvador Option,” which references the U.S. military assistance program, initiated under the Carter Administration and subsequently pursued by the Reagan Administration, that funded and supported “nationalist” paramilitary forces who hunted down and assassinated rebel leaders and their supporters in El Salvador. This program in El Salvador was highly controversial and received much public backlash in the U.S., as tens of thousands of innocent civilians were assassinated and “disappeared,” including notable members of the Catholic Church, Archbishop Oscar Romero and the four American churchwomen. According to the Newsweek report, Pentagon conservatives wanted to resurrect the Salvadoran program in Iraq because they believed that despite the incredible cost in human lives and human rights, it was successful in eradicating guerrillas.

Mr. Secretary, at a news conference on January 11, 2005, you publicly stated that the idea of a Salvador option was “nonsense.” Yet mounting evidence suggests that the U.S. has in fact funded and trained Iraqi assassination and kidnapping teams and these teams are now operating with horrific success across Iraq.

We know that the Pentagon received funding for training Iraqi paramilitaries.

About one year before the Newsweek report on the “Salvador Option,” it was reported in the American Prospect magazine on January 1, 2004 [“Phoenix Rising” by Robert Dreyfuss, American Prospect vol. 15, no. 1] that part of $3 billion of the $87 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill to fund operations in Iraq, signed into law on November 6, 2003, was designated for the creation of a paramilitary unit manned by militiamen associated with former Iraqi exile groups. According to the Prospect article, experts predicted that creation of this paramilitary unit would “lead to a wave of extrajudicial killings, not only of armed rebels but of nationalists, other opponents of the U.S. occupation and thousands of civilian Baathists.” The article further described how the bulk of the $3 billion program, disguised as an Air Force classified program, would be used to “support U.S. efforts to create a lethal, and revenge-minded Iraqi security force.” According to one of the article’s sources, John Pike, an expert of classified military budgets at www.globalsecurity.org, “the big money would be for standing up an Iraqi secret police to liquidate the resistance.”

We know that some of the Pentagon’s Iraq experts were involved in the Reagan Administration’s paramilitary program in El Salvador.

Colonel James Steele, Counselor to the U.S. Ambassador for Iraqi Security Forces, formerly led the U.S. Military Advisory Group in El Salvador from 1984-1986, where he developed special operating forces at brigade level during the height of the conflict. The role of these forces in El Salvador was to attack “insurgent” leadership, their supporters, sources of supply, and base camps. Currently Colonel Steele has been assigned to work with the new elite Iraqi counter-insurgency unit known as the Special Police Commandos, operating under Iraq’s Interior Ministry.

Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, was U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from June 2004 to April 2005. From 1981 to 1985, he was ambassador to Honduras where he played a key role in coordinating U.S. covert aid to the Contras, anti-Sandinista militias who targeted civilians in Nicaragua. Additionally, he oversaw the U.S. backing of a military death squad in Honduras, Battalion 3-16, which specialized in torture and assassination. The U.S. had similar programs of supporting paramilitary groups set up Nicaragua and Honduras as its program in El Salvador. In a Democracy Now interview on January 10, 2005, Allan Nairn, who broke the story about U.S. support of death squads in El Salvador, suspected that Ambassador Negroponte would most likely be involved in the economic side of U.S. support to death squads in Iraq.

We know that a wave of abductions and executions, in the style of the death squads of El Salvador, and with ties to an official government sponsor, and to the U.S., has hit Iraq.

News reports over the past 10 months strongly suggest that the U.S. has trained and supported highly organized Iraqi commando brigades, and that some of those brigades have operated as death squads, abducting and assassinating thousands of Iraqis. Some news highlights:

  • May 1, 2005 Los Angeles Times reports that the U.S. is providing technical and logistical support to the Maghawir (Fearless Warrior) brigades, the Interior Ministry’s special commandos, according to Major General Rasheed Flayih Mohammed. Iraqi authorities plan to increase deployment of the 12,000-strong Maghawir (Fearless Warrior) brigades, which are composed of well-trained veterans who have worked closely with U.S. forces in Najaf, Fallujah and Mosul and include the Wolf, Scorpion, Tiger and Thunder brigades.
  • May 16-20, 2005 — Los Angeles Times and New York Times reveal discovery of 46 bodies, all Iraqi men abducted and slain execution-style, in various locations: floating in the Tigris, dumped in ditches and garbage-strewn lots, and buried at a poultry farm.
  • June 15, 2005 Washington Post reports that U.S. forces had knowledge of secret and illegal abductions of hundreds of minority Arabs in Kirkuk. The abductions were by forces led by Kurdish political parties and backed by the U.S. military.
  • June 20, 2005 Los Angeles Times reports that Saad Sultan, of Iraq Human Rights Ministry said that police and security forces attached to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, thousands of whom have been trained by American instructors, are responsible for abusing up to 60% of estimated 12,000 detainees in prison and military compounds. He says the units have used tactics reminiscent of Saddam’s secret intelligence squads.
  • July 3, 2005 — Reuters News reports that the government of Iraq publicly acknowledged that the new security forces were using torture. Article further says that accounts are common of people being seized by armed men in the uniforms of the police, army or special units like Baghdad’s Wolf Brigade police commandos, and then disappearing without trace or being found dead.
  • July 28, 2005 Los Angeles Times reports that members of a California Army National Guard company, the Alpha Company, who were implicated in a detainee abuse scandal, trained and conducted joint operations with the Wolf Brigade, a commando unit criticized for human rights abuses. In an online Alpha Company newsletter, Captain Haviland wrote, “We have assigned 2nd Platoon to help them transition, and install some of our ‘Killer Company’ aggressive tactical spirit in them.” The article further states that despite the Wolf Brigade’s controversial reputation for human rights violations, it is regarded as the gold standard for Iraqi security forces by U.S. military officials.
  • August 31, 2005 — BBC reports that on the night of August 24, a large force of the Volcano Brigade raided homes in Al-Hurriyah city in the Baghdad, kidnapping and then executing 76 citizens. The victims were all shot in the head after their hands and feet had been tied up. They suffered the harshest forms of torture, deformation and burning.
  • November 16, 2005 — Reuters News reports the discovery of 173 malnourished men, some of whom were tortured, imprisoned in a secret jail run by Shi’ite militias tied to the Interior Ministry.
  • November 17, 2005 Newsday reports that in the past year, the U.S. military has helped build up Iraqi commandos under guidance from James Steele, a former Army Special Forces officer who led U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in El Salvador in the 1980s. The brigades built up over the past year include the Lion Brigade, Scorpion Brigade and Volcano Brigade.
  • February 15, 2006 — Associated Press reports that the Interior Ministry has launched a probe into death squad allegations.
  • February 19, 2006 — BBC reveals that morgues in Baghdad receive dozens of bodies picked up daily from rivers, sewage plants, waste burial sites, farms and desert areas. Most of the bodies are handcuffed and blindfolded civilians with a bullet or more in the forehead, indicating that they were executed. The handcuffs used on the victims are like those used by the Iraqi police.
  • February 26, 2006 — The Independent reports that outgoing United Nations’ human rights chief in Iraq, John Pace, revealed that hundreds of Iraqis are being tortured to death or summarily executed every month in Baghdad alone by the death squads working from the Ministry of Interior. He said that up to three-quarters of the corpses stacked in the Baghdad mortuary show evidence of gunshot wounds to the head or injuries caused by drill-bits or burning cigarettes.
  • March 9, 2006 — Los Angeles Times reports that Iraqi police officers who worked at the Interior Ministry’s illegal prison had received American training, and that U.S. trainers have also given extensive support to 27 brigades of heavily armed commandos accused of a series of abuses, including the death of 14 Sunni Arabs who were locked in an airtight van last summer.
  • March 10, 2006 — Sidney Morning Herald reports that men wearing the uniforms of U.S.-trained security forces, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, abducted 50 people in a daylight raid on a security agency. Masked men who are driving what appear to be new government-owned vehicles are carrying out many of the raids.
  • March 27, 2006 — The Independent reports that while U.S. authorities have begun criticizing the Iraqi government over the “death squads,” many of the paramilitary groups accused of the abuse, such as the Wolf Brigade, the Scorpion Brigade and the Special Police Commandos were set up with the help of the American military. Furthermore, the militiamen were provided with U.S. advisers some of whom were veterans of Latin American counter-insurgency which also had led to allegations of death squads at the time.

Mr. Secretary, in light of this evidence of U.S. support for and the existence of death squads in Iraq, what is the basis for your January 11, 2005 statement, that the idea of a Salvador option in Iraq is “nonsense”?

I request a copy of all records pertaining to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise, support and train Iraqi assassination and kidnapping teams. I look forward to receiving your response.

Sincerely,
Dennis J. Kucinich,
Member of Congress

06.01.06

Stealing the 2004 Election: RFK Jr. Tells How It Was Done

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 10:39 pm by Spencer

Wow.  “Was the 2004 Election Stolen?” by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (in the latest issue of Rolling Stone) is another (long) piece of required reading.

Rolling Stone has been throwing down with some pretty interesting investigative reporting lately that almost harkens back to its heyday during the Watergate era.

05.10.06

Journal of National Security Law & Policy

Posted in What I'm Reading, Torture, Spooks, Covert Action, Politics at 8:21 pm by Spencer

The McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific has launched a new quarterly, the Journal of National Security Law and Policy, now in its second issue. For now, at least, they’re posting all articles as PDFs for free download, so if’n you’re interested — and you should be — get on over there.

The journal focuses on “questions of war and terrorism, international relations, democracy, and civil liberties.” While peer-reviewed and faculty edited, its authorial base is broader than might be expected, reaching “across doctrinal lines by involving academics from disciplines other than law, as well as members of the military, intelligence, law enforcement, and civil liberties communities.”
The current issue includes papers from two symposia, one on “Fighting Terrorism with Torture: Where to Draw the Line?” and the second on “Lawyers’ Roles in the War on Terror.” Topics include Abu Ghraib (facetiously titled “‘Just for Fun’”), examinations of the CIA’s current role in torture and of the Military Commissions (”Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems?”), and the ramifications of the notorious 2002 “torture memo” issued by the White House Office of Legal Counsel. See why you should be interested?

The legal aspects of the War on Terror ™ in general, the sweeping reinterpretations (cough) of law and treaty obligations staked out by the Bush Administration, the to-date compliant — nay, the treasonously collaborationist — attitude of Congress, the GOP’s highyl successful packing of the federal judiciary with ideological neanderthals, and the domestic and international implications of it all mean that the Journal of National Security Law & Policy — or at least its focus — is something to pay very close attention to.

And while such journals may sometimes make for dry reading, if you’ve got four neurons to rub together, can read at a freshman collegiate level, and have access to Google for the toughies and tangents you can easily understand this sort of fare.

04.28.06

Red Alert: CIA and NSA to Be Given ‘Warrentless Arrest’ Power

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Torture, Spooks, Covert Action at 12:17 am by Spencer

This really is gravely serious. Please act IMMEDIATELY: contact your Congressional Representative and tell them to oppose this terrifying and utterly irresponsible slide into a Gestapo state. Find/contact your Representative via http://www.house.gov/writerep/

The House version of the 2007 intelligence authorization bill — H.R. 5020 — would grant CIA and NSA security personnel the authority to make “warrantless arrests” for “any felony” committed in their presence, no matter how remote from the foreign intelligence mission it might be or where they occurred, the Baltimore Sun reported on April 25, 2006.

Section 432 of the bill grants similar authority to NSA security personnel.

For more info, see:

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2006/04/house_poised_to_grant_arrest_p.html

and

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal-te.spies25apr25,0,5928384.story

For the full bill –HR 5020 — see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5020:
(Relevant excerpts are also quoted below.)

This legislation would create what can only be characterized as a secret police force controlled directly by the President. This is precisely the American Gestapo that the Republicans themselves warned about when Truman first sought to create the CIA in 1945.

There are two (count ‘em) fig leaves in the legislation, both meaningless. First, the power of warrentless arrest would apply “only” to “personnel designated to carry out protective functions.” A literalist reading of this would equate to security personnel; in practice there is nothing to prevent the Director of Central Intelligence (Porter Goss, a partisan Republican warrior whose leadership had sharply divided the CIA) from “designating” every employee, agent, and asset of the CIA as having a “protective function.” Second (albeit not quoted below), the DCI’s and NSA director’s “policies” must be in line with “policies” promulgated by the Attorney General. But considering that our current Atty. Gen., Alberto Gonzales, signed on to the notion that no law or treaty or Constitutional provison in any way restricts the President from authorizing torture and, jeepers, unilateral secret detention of anyone anywhere, this is obviously a distinction without a difference.

Let us review the basic current situation:

* The President has claimed for himself the power to hold anyone, including any US citizen, in secret detention “exempt” from habeas corpus protection.

* The President claims the courts have no jurisdiction. After the Supreme Court challenged this, Congress recently passed a law (still untested in the courts) specifically declaring that the courts have no jurisdiction over such “detentions”.

* Ever-mounting evidence from multiple independent sources makes it undeniable that A) an unknown but presumably large number of persons have been abducted by US intelligence and military personnel, and B) an extensive “black” network of airplanes is secretly transporting these abductees to third countries for incarceration, interrogation, and torture (otherwise…why do it at all, and why fire CIA analysts for allegedly leaking the info)

* In January 2005, Newsweek reported senior Pentagon counterinsurgency planners were seriously considering what they referred to as “The Salvador Option” for Iraq — meaning creating and controlling death squads just as had been done throughout Latin America during the latter years of the Cold War. Less than a year later, the first press reports began to surface of death squad activity in Iraq, believed to be tied to the Iraqi Interior Ministry.

* The Bush Administration has made it abundantly clear that it makes little or no distinction between tactics and strategies that can/should be applied abroad vs. domestically.

* The “warrantless arrest” provision was inserted into the bill at the request of National Intelligence Director John D. Negroponte. As US Ambassador to Honduras during the 1980s, Negroponte helped facilitate and cover-up, you guessed it, death squad activities in Latin America.

* There have been numerous accurate reports in recent months of sweeping abuses of power in the “war on terror” directly targeting the homeland population.

Now the House wants to grant arrest powers to the CIA and the NSA??!?!?!

SPECIFIC LANGUAGE:

H.R.5020
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

[…snip…]

(b) Authority to Arrest-

(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

`Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency

`(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective functions for the Central Intelligence Agency under section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while engaged in such protective functions, make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that felony offense.

[…snip…]

SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL.

[…snip…]

(b) Authority to Arrest-

(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:

`Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security Agency

`(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective functions for the Agency to–

`(1) carry firearms; and

`(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that felony offense.

[…end quote…]

« Previous entries ·