08.26.07

Interview with National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell

Posted in News of the World, What I'm Reading, Spooks, ELINT, Covert Action, Politics at 12:06 am by Spencer

This week the El Paso Times ran a rare on the record interview with Mike McConnell. As the current National Intelligence Director, he is responsible for coordinating the entire US intelligence community (previously the job of the director of the CIA).

A complete transcript of the interview was published on the El Paso Times web site, and this is archived below.  Though a couple passages read a little incoherently, remember that this is a raw transcript of an actual conversation.  It also could’ve used one more pass by a copy editor.

Transcript: Debate on the foreign intelligence surveillance act
By Chris Roberts
El Paso Times (Texas), August 22, 2007
http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_6685679

The following is the transcript of a question and answer session with National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell.

Question: How much has President Bush or members of his administration formed your response to the FISA debate?

Answer: Not at all. When I came back in, remember my previous assignment was director of the NSA, so this was an area I have known a little bit about. So I came back in. I was nominated the first week of January. The administration had made a decision to put the terrorist surveillance program into the FISA court. I think that happened the 7th of Jan. So as I come in the door and I’m prepping for the hearings, this sort of all happened. So the first thing I want to know is what’s this program and what’s the background and I was pretty surprised at what I learned. First off, the issue was the technology had changed and we had worked ourselves into a position that we were focusing on foreign terrorist communications, and this was a terrorist foreigner in a foreign country. The issue was international communications are on a wire so all of a sudden we were in a position because of the wording in the law that we had to have a warrant to do that. So the most important thing to capture is that it’s a foreigner in a foreign country, required to get a warrant. Now if it were wireless, we would not be required to get a warrant. Plus we were limited in what we were doing to terrorism only and the last time I checked we had a mission called foreign intelligence, which should be construed to mean anything of a foreign intelligence interest, North Korea, China, Russia, Syria, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, military development and it goes on and on and on. So when I engaged with the administration, I said we’ve gotten ourselves into a position here where we need to clarify, so the FISA issue had been debated and legislation had been passed in the house in 2006, did not pass the Senate. Two bills were introduced in the Senate, I don’t know if it was co-sponsorship or two different bills, but Sen. (Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif.) had a bill and Sen. Specter had a bill and it may have been the same bill, I don’t know, but the point is a lot of debate, a lot of dialogue. So, it was submitted to the FISA court and the first ruling in the FISA court was what we needed to do we could do with an approval process that was at a summary level and that was OK, we stayed in business and we’re doing our mission. Well in the FISA process, you may or may not be aware …

Q: When you say summary level, do you mean the FISA court?

A: The FISA court. The FISA court ruled presented the program to them and they said the program is what you say it is and it’s appropriate and it’s legitimate, it’s not an issue and was had approval. But the FISA process has a renewal. It comes up every so many days and there are 11 FISA judges. So the second judge looked at the same data and said well wait a minute I interpret the law, which is the FISA law, differently. And it came down to, if it’s on a wire and it’s foreign in a foreign country, you have to have a warrant and so we found ourselves in a position of actually losing ground because it was the first review was less capability, we got a stay and that took us to the 31st of May. After the 31st of May we were in extremis because now we have significantly less capability. And meantime, the community, before I came back, had been working on a National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threat to the homeland. And the key elements of the terrorist threat to the homeland, there were four key elements, a resilient determined adversary with senior leadership willing to die for the cause, requiring a place to train and develop, think of it as safe haven, they had discovered that in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now the Pakistani government is pushing and pressing and attempting to do something about it, but by and large they have areas of safe haven. So leadership that can adapt, safe haven, intermediate leadership, these are think of them as trainers, facilitators, operational control guys. And the fourth part is recruits. They have them, they’ve taken them. This area is referred to as the FATA, federally administered tribal areas, they have the recruits and now the objective is to get them into the United States for mass casualties to conduct terrorist operations to achieve mass casualties. All of those four parts have been carried out except the fourth. They have em, but they haven’t been successful. One of the major tools for us to keep them out is the FISA program, a significant tool and we’re going the wrong direction. So, for me it was extremis to start talking not only to the administration, but to members of the hill. So from June until the bill was passed, I think I talked to probably 260 members, senators and congressmen. We submitted the bill in April, had an open hearing 1 May, we had a closed hearing in May, I don’t remember the exact date. Chairman (U.S. Rep. Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas) had two hearings and I had a chance to brief the judiciary committee in the house, the intelligence committee in the house and I just mentioned the Senate, did not brief the full judiciary committee in the Senate, but I did meet with Sen. (Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.) and Sen. (Arlen Specter, R-Pa.), and I did have an opportunity on the Senate side, they have a tradition there of every quarter they invite the director of national intelligence in to talk to them update them on topics of interest. And that happened in (June 27). Well what they wanted to hear about was Iraq and Afghanistan and for whatever reason, I’m giving them my review and they ask questions in the order in which they arrive in the room. The second question was on FISA, so it gave me an opportunity to, here I am worrying about this problem and I have 41 senators and I said several things. The current threat is increasing, I’m worried about it. Our capability is decreasing and let me explain the problem.

Q: Can’t you get the warrant after the fact?

A: The issue is volume and time. Think about foreign intelligence. What it presented me with an opportunity is to make the case for something current, but what I was really also trying to put a strong emphasis on is the need to do foreign intelligence in any context. My argument was that the intelligence community should not be restricted when we are conducting foreign surveillance against a foreigner in a foreign country, just by dint of the fact that it happened to touch a wire. We haven’t done that in wireless for years.

Q: So you end up with people tied up doing paperwork?

A: It takes about 200 man hours to do one telephone number. Think about it from the judges standpoint. Well, is this foreign intelligence? Well how do you know it’s foreign intelligence? Well what does Abdul calling Mohammed mean, and how do I interpret that? So, it’s a very complex process, so now, I’ve got people speaking Urdu and Farsi and, you know, whatever, Arabic, pull them off the line have them go through this process to justify what it is they know and why and so on. And now you’ve got to write it all up and it goes through the signature process, take it through (the Justice Department), and take it down to the FISA court. So all that process is about 200 man hours for one number. We’re going backwards, we couldn’t keep up. So the issue was …

Q: How many calls? Thousands?

A: Don’t want to go there. Just think, lots. Too many. Now the second part of the issue was under the president’s program, the terrorist surveillance program, the private sector had assisted us. Because if you’re going to get access you’ve got to have a partner and they were being sued. Now if you play out the suits at the value they’re claimed, it would bankrupt these companies. So my position was we have to provide liability protection to these private sector entities. So that was part of the request. So we went through that and we argued it. Some wanted to limit us to terrorism. My argument was, wait a minute, why would I want to limit it to terrorism. It may be that terrorists are achieving weapons of mass destruction, the only way I would know that is if I’m doing foreign intelligence by who might be providing a weapon of mass destruction.

Q: And this is still all foreign to foreign communication?

A: All foreign to foreign. So, in the final analysis, I was after three points, no warrant for a foreigner overseas, a foreign intelligence target located overseas, liability protection for the private sector and the third point was we must be required to have a warrant for surveillance against a U.S. person. And when I say U.S. person I want to make sure you capture what that means. That does not mean citizen. That means a foreigner, who is here, we still have to have a warrant because he’s here. My view is that that’s the right check and balances and it’s the right protection for the country and lets us still do our mission for protection of the country. And we’re trying to fend off foreign threats.

Q: So are you satisfied with it the way it is now?

A: I am. The issue that we did not address, which has to be addressed is the liability protection for the private sector now is proscriptive, meaning going forward. We’ve got a retroactive problem. When I went through and briefed the various senators and congressmen, the issue was alright, look, we don’t want to work that right now, it’s too hard because we want to find out about some issues of the past. So what I recommended to the administration is, ‘Let’s take that off the table for now and take it up when Congress reconvenes in September.’

Q: With an eye toward the six-month review?

A: No, the retroactive liability protection has got to be addressed.

Q: And that’s not in the current law?

A: It is not. Now people have said that I negotiated in bad faith, or I did not keep my word or whatever…

Q: That you had an agenda that you weren’t honest about.

A: I’ll give you the facts from my point of view. When I checked on board I had my discussion with the president. I’m an apolitical figure. I’m not a Republican, I’m not a Democrat. I have voted for both. My job is as a professional to try to do this job the best way I can in terms of, from the intelligence community, protect the nation. So I made my argument that we should have the ability to do surveillance the same way we’ve done it for the past 50 years and not be inhibited when it’s a foreigner in a foreign country. The president’s guidance to me early in the process, was, ‘You’ve got the experience. I trust your judgement. You make the right call. There’s no pressure from anybody here to tell you how to do it. He did that early. He revisited with me in June. He did it again in July and he said it publicly on Friday before the bill was passed. We were at the FBI, it’s an annual thing, we go to the FBI and do a homeland security kind of update. So he came out at noon and said, ‘I’m requesting that Congress pass this bill. It’s essential. Do it before you go on recess. I’m depending on Mike McConnell’s recommendations. And that was the total sum and substance of the guidance and the involvement from the White House with regard to how I should make the call. Now, as we negotiated, we started with 66 pages, were trying to get everything cleaned up at once. When I reduced it to my three points, we went from 66 pages to 11. Now, this is a very, very complex bill. I had a team of 20 lawyers working. You can change a word in a paragraph and end up with some major catastrophe down in paragraph 27, subsection 2c, to shut yourself down, you’ll be out of business. So when we send up our 11 pages, we had a lot of help in making sure we got it just right so it would come back and we’d say wait a minute we can’t live with this or one of the lawyers would say, ‘Wait we tried that, it won’t work, here’s the problem.’ So we kept going back and forth, so we sent up a version like Monday, we sent up a version on Wednesday, we sent up a version on Thursday. The House leadership, or the Democratic leadership on Thursday took that bill and we talked about it. And my response was there are some things I can’t live with in this bill and they said alright we’re going to fix them. Now, here’s the issue. I never then had a chance to read it for the fix because, again, it’s so complex, if you change a word or phrase, or even a paragraph reference, you can cause unintended …

Q: You have to make sure it’s all consistent?

A: Right. So I can’t agree to it until it’s in writing and my 20 lawyers, who have been doing this for two years, can work through it. So in the final analysis, I was put in the position of making a call on something I hadn’t read. So when it came down to crunch time, we got a copy and it had some of the offending language back in it. So I said, ‘I can’t support it.’ And it played out in the House the way it played out in the House. Meantime on the Senate side, there were two versions being looked at. The Wednesday version and the Thursday version. And one side took one version and the other side took the other version. The Thursday version, we had some help, and I didn’t get a chance to review it. So now, it’s Friday night, the Senate’s voting. They were having their debate and I still had not had a chance to review it. So, I walked over, I was up visiting some senators trying to explain some of the background. So I walked over to the chamber and as I walked into the office just off the chamber, it’s the vice president’s office, somebody gave me a copy. So I looked at the version and said, ‘Can’t do it. The same language was back in there.’

Q: What was it?

A: Just let me leave it, not too much detail, there were things with regard to our authorities some language around minimization. So it put us in an untenable position. So then I had another version to take a look at, which was our Wednesday version, which basically was unchanged. So I said, well certainly, I’m going to support that Wednesday version. So that’s what I said and the vote happened in the Senate and that was on Friday. So now it rolled to the House on Saturday. They took up the bill, they had a spirited debate, my name was invoked several times, not in a favorable light in some cases. (laughs) And they took a vote and it passed 226 to 182, I think. So it’s law. The president signed it on Sunday and here we are.

Q: That’s far from unanimous. There’s obviously going to be more debate on this.

A: There are a couple of issues to just be sensitive to. There’s a claim of reverse targeting. Now what that means is we would target somebody in a foreign country who is calling into the United States and our intent is to not go after the bad guy, but to listen to somebody in the United States. That’s not legal, it’s, it would be a breach of the Fourth Amendment. You can go to jail for that sort of thing. And If a foreign bad guy is calling into the United States, if there’s a need to have a warrant, for the person in the United States, you just get a warrant. And so if a terrorist calls in and it’s another terrorist, I think the American public would want us to do surveillance of that U.S. person in this case. So we would just get a warrant and do that. It’s a manageable thing. On the U.S. persons side it’s 100 or less. And then the foreign side, it’s in the thousands. Now there’s a sense that we’re doing massive data mining. In fact, what we’re doing is surgical. A telephone number is surgical. So, if you know what number, you can select it out. So that’s, we’ve got a lot of territory to make up with people believing that we’re doing things we’re not doing.

Q: Even if it’s perception, how do you deal with that? You have to do public relations, I assume.

A: Well, one of the things you do is you talk to reporters. And you give them the facts the best you can. Now part of this is a classified world. The fact we’re doing it this way means that some Americans are going to die, because we do this mission unknown to the bad guys because they’re using a process that we can exploit and the more we talk about it, the more they will go with an alternative means and when they go to an alternative means, remember what I said, a significant portion of what we do, this is not just threats against the United States, this is war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q. So you’re saying that the reporting and the debate in Congress means that some Americans are going to die?

A. That’s what I mean. Because we have made it so public. We used to do these things very differently, but for whatever reason, you know, it’s a democratic process and sunshine’s a good thing. We need to have the debate. The reason that the FISA law was passed in 1978 was an arrangement was worked out between the Congress and the administration, we did not want to allow this community to conduct surveillance, electronic surveillance, of Americans for foreign intelligence unless you had a warrant, so that was required. So there was no warrant required for a foreign target in a foreign land. And so we are trying to get back to what was the intention of ‘78. Now because of the claim, counterclaim, mistrust, suspicion, the only way you could make any progress was to have this debate in an open way.

Q. So you don’t think there was an alternative way to do this?

A. There may have been an alternative way, but we are where are …

Q. A better way, I should say.

A. All of my briefs initially were very classified. But it became apparent that we were not going to be able to carry the day if we don’t talk to more people.

Q. Some might say that’s the price you pay for living in a free society. Do you think that this is necessary that these Americans die?

A. We could have gotten there a different way. We conducted intelligence since World War II and we’ve maintained a sensitivity as far as sources and methods. It’s basically a sources and methods argument. If you don’t protect sources and methods then those you target will choose alternative means, different paths. As it is today al-Qaida in Iraq is targeting Americans, specifically the coalition. There are activities supported by other nations to import electronic, or explosively formed projectiles, to do these roadside attacks and what we know about that is often out of very sensitive sources and methods. So the more public it is, then they take it away from us. So that’s the tradeoff.

DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Q: I wanted to ask you about the diversity question. This has major ramifications here, we have this center of excellence program that’s recruiting high school kids, many of whom wouldn’t qualify if first generation American citizens weren’t allowed.

A: So you agree with me?

Q: It does sound like something that would benefit this area that would also allow you to get people from here who are bicultural and have an openness to seeing things …

A: You’re talking about Hispanics?

Q: Yes.

A: Hispanics are probably the most under-represented group if you think of America, what the ethic makeup of America, Hispanics are the most under-represented group in my community. Now, that said, and should increase that Hispanic population and programs like this will do that. That’s why the outreach. But also we need, particularly with the current problem of terrorism, we need to have speakers of Urdu and Farsi and Arabic and people from those cultures that understand the issues of tribes and clans and all the things that go with understanding that part of the world. Varying religions and so on. Because it is, it’s almost impossible, I’ve had the chance to live in the Middle East for years, I’ve studied it for years, it’s impossible to understand it without having some feel for the culture and so on. So while I’m all for increasing the diversity along the lines we talked about, I’m also very much in favor of first generation Americans from the countries that are causing issues and problems.

Q: What is the status of that program.

A: It is not in statue. It is not in policy. It has been habit. So we’ve stated, as a matter of policy, that we’re not going to abide by those habits.

Q: And that’s already the case?

A: Yes, and are we making progress? Not fast enough, but we will make progress over time.

Q: How do you measure that?

A: Very simple, you get to measure what are you and where are you trying go and are you making progress. I wrestled with this years ago when I was NSA ….

Q: You don’t want quotas, though?

A: Quotas are forbidden so we set goals. My way of thinking about it is what is your end state? Now some would say that federal governments should look like America, whatever that is. OK, that sounded like a reasonable metric, so I said, ‘Alright, what does America look like?’ So I got a bunch of numbers. I said, ‘Alright, what do we look like?’ and it didn’t match, and as I just told you, the one place where there’s the greatest mismatch is Hispanic. It’s much closer, as matter of fact, people would be surprised how close it is across, at least my community among the other minorities. Now, that said, numbers don’t necessarily equal positioning in the organization. So that’s another feature we have to work on, is placement of women and minorities in leadership positions.

Q: So, you’re quantifying that as well?

A: Yes.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY ON THE NATION’S SOUTHWEST BORDER

Q: There seems to be very little terrorist-related activity on the Southwest border, which is watched very closely because of the illegal immigration issue. Can you talk about why it’s important to be alert here?

A: Let me go back to my NIE, those are unclassified key judgements, pull them down and look at them. You’ve got committed leadership. You’ve got a place to train. They’ve got trainers and they’ve got recruits. The key now is getting recruits in. So if the key is getting recruits in. So, if you’re key is getting recruits in, how would you do that? And so, how would you do that?

Q: I’d go to the northern border where there’s nobody watching.

A: And that’s a path. Flying in is a path. Taking a ship in is a path. Coming up through the Mexican border is a path. Now are they doing it in great numbers, no. Because we’re finding them and we’re identifying them and we’ve got watch lists and we’re keeping them at bay. There are numerous situations where people are alive today because we caught them (terrorists). And my point earlier, we catch them or we prevent them because we’ve got the sources and methods that lets us identify them and do something about it. And you know the more sources and methods are compromised, we have that problem.

Q: And in many cases we don’t hear about them?

A: The vast majority you don’t hear about. Remember, let me give you a way to think about this. If you’ve got an issue, you have three potential outcomes, only three. A diplomatic success, an operational success or an intelligence failure. Because all those diplomatic successes and operations successes where there’s intelligence contribution, it’s not an intelligence success. It’s just part of the process. But if there’s an intelligence failure …

Q: Then you hear about it.

A: So, are terrorists coming across the Southwest border? Not in great numbers.

Q: There are some cases?

A: There are some. And would they use it as a path, given it was available to them? In time they will.

Q: If they’re successful at it, then they’ll probably repeat it.

A: Sure. There were a significant number of Iraqis who came across last year. Smuggled across illegally.

Q: Where was that?

A: Across the Southwest border.

Q: Can you give me anymore detail?

A: I probably could if I had my notebook. It’s significant numbers. I’ll have somebody get it for you. I don’t remember what it is.

Q: The point is it went from a number to (triple) in a single year, because they figured it out. Now some we caught, some we didn’t. The ones that get in, what are they going to do? They’re going to write home. So, it’s not rocket science, word will move around. There’s a program now in South America, where you can, once you’re in South American countries, you can move around in South America and Central America without a visa. So you get a forged passport in Lebanon or where ever that gets you to South America. Now, no visa, you can move around, and with you’re forged passport, as a citizen of whatever, you could come across that border. So, what I’m highlighting is that something …

Q: Is this how it happened, the cases you’re talking about?

A: Yes.

02.05.07

Windows Vista! It’s Spook-erific!

Posted in Web Dev, News of the World, What I'm Reading, Browsers, Spooks, ELINT at 9:23 pm by Spencer

Although just about a month old now, this news item just crossed the ol’ Brainpain today…

For Windows Vista Security, Microsoft Called in Pros

By Alec Klein and Ellen Nakashima
Washington Post
Tuesday, January 9, 2007

When Microsoft introduces its long-awaited Windows Vista operating system this month, it will have an unlikely partner to thank for making its flagship product safe and secure for millions of computer users across the world: the National Security Agency.

For the first time, the giant software maker is acknowledging the help of the secretive agency, better known for eavesdropping on foreign officials and, more recently, U.S. citizens as part of the Bush administration’s effort to combat terrorism. The agency said it has helped in the development of the security of Microsoft’s new operating system — the brains of a computer — to protect it from worms, Trojan horses and other insidious computer attackers.

“Our intention is to help everyone with security,” Tony W. Sager, the NSA’s chief of vulnerability analysis and operations group, said yesterday. [cough]

The NSA’s impact may be felt widely. Windows commands more than 90 percent of the worldwide market share in desktop operating systems, and Vista, which is set to be released to consumers Jan. 30, is expected to be used by more than 600 million computer users by 2010, according to Al Gillen, an analyst at market research firm International Data.

…”I kind of call it a Good Housekeeping seal” of approval, said Michael Cherry, a former Windows program manager who now analyzes the product for Directions on Microsoft, a firm that tracks the software maker. …

Yyyyeah. Duly noted.

Read the full article at the link above. Although…I would be remiss to not quote the following as well:

…Other software makers have turned to government agencies for security advice, including Apple, which makes the Mac OS X operating system. “We work with a number of U.S. government agencies on Mac OS X security and collaborated with the NSA on the Mac OS X security configuration guide,” said Apple spokesman Anuj Nayar in an e-mail.

Novell, which sells a Linux-based operating system, also works with government agencies on software security issues, spokesman Bruce Lowry said in an e-mail, “but we’re not in a position to go into specifics of the who, what, when types of questions.” …

12.29.06

FBI Uses Razr, Nextel, and Samsung Phones as Bugs, Even When They’re Off

Posted in Spooks, ELINT, Science at 1:00 pm by Spencer

As reported in this Dec. 13, 2006, wire story in the Seattle Times (and originally reported by CNET on Dec. 1), the FBI now has the capability of using several high-end models of cell phones to conduct audio surveillance, even when the phones are powered off.

The new technique, public details of which are scant, came to light in a Nov. 27, 2006 court opinion (excerpts) issued by US District Judge Lewis Kaplan in a case involving a multi-year investigation of top members of the Genovese crime family in New York state. Ten of 34 defendants in the case had moved to suppress evidence gathered using the cell phones. In the opinion, Kaplan ruled the evidence was legally obtained under Federal laws authorizing “roving bugs.”

The FBI, not surprisingly, will not discuss specifics of the technique. Kaplan’s opinion states, “The device functioned whether the phone was powered on or off, intercepting conversations within its range wherever it happened to be.”

James Atkinson, described by CNET as “a counter-surveillance consultant who has worked closely with government agencies” and employed by the Granite Island Group in Massachusetts, told reporters that the technique likely utilizes the built-in capability of higher-end cell phones to automatically download software and firmware updates. A special update could be “pushed” to the phone causing it to discreetly activate the microphone, capturing all sound in its vicinity and transmitting it in the clear, where it could be easily intercepted and recorded. This approach, long discussed in security and hacker circles, would not require physical access to the phone, Atkinson said.

The only defense against such surveillance would be to physically remove the phone’s battery, or to be inside a Faraday cage, which blocks all static electrical fields and electromagnetic radiation.

Nextell, Motorola Razr, and Samsung 900 series phones are reported to be particularly vulnerable to such an exploit, though other makes and models are as well. Ironically (for the mobsters), the US Commerce Department web site first posted a public warning about just such a vulnerability in 2001. Court documents related to court approval of the roving taps list Nextel as the carrier used by at least one of the indicted suspects, John Ardito. When queried for the story by CNET, Nextel, Mortorola and various wireless carriers declined to comment.

While some security experts consulted by CNET maintain the Bureau probably gained access to the cell phones and physically installed a special transmitter (pointing in part to related affadavits that discuss a “listening device placed in the cellular telephone”), the general consensus favors the remote activation method.

The FBI’s use of similar remote activation of OnStar systems in GM cars for surveillance purposes was revealed as a result of a 2003 lawsuit.

In 2004, the BBC reported that intelligence agencies and industrial spies routinely use remote activation of cell phones to conduct covert surveillance. The news article was written as a backgrounder after British MP Clare Short revealed that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other senior UN officials had been bugged by British spy agencies during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. The BBC backgrounder theorized that remote activation of UN delegates’ cell phones was the likeliest method the surveillance had been conducted.

Short’s revelations came after the collapse of the prosecution of Katherine Gun, an employee of GCHQ (the British equivalent of the NSA), who was charged with releasing a secret email from US spies “requesting British help in bugging UN delegates ahead of the Iraq invasion.” Short stated categorically that she had “seen transcripts of Kofi Annan’s conversations.”

A year prior, in 2003, a security sweep at the European Union headquarters in Brussels revealed the phone lines of six EU member countries had been tapped during a period of intense diplomacy surrounding the then-pending invasion of Iraq. That case, however, reportedly involved physical listening devices and not remote activation of cell phones. Belgian police told reporters for Le Figaro they had identified the devices as American, but EU officials said at the time they could not identify their origin.

A 1994 Federal law — the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) — mandated that carriers modify their networks to make it easier for law enforcement (and now, post-PATRIOT ACT, intelligence agencies) to tap digital telephone communications. In 2005, the FCC issued an administrative “Final Rule” extending CALEA to internet broadband and Voice-over-IP (VoIP) providers. EPIC and other privacy groups filed suit, challenging the measure as an illegal expansion of the law. (More at EPIC’s web site.)

06.25.06

Below the Fold on the NY Times Bank Data Story

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT at 9:19 am by Spencer

The Bush spy-scandal du jour is, of course, about the massive data mining of international financial transfer data from the Belgian cooperative SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications.

Without rehashing the story or debating the program’s merits and faults here (okay, maybe a little), I’d just like to point out an aspect of the story that has gotten lost in the dust up. Pretty much all of the coverage so far, even including re-edited syndicated versions of the original NY Times article as it appeared in local papers across the US, has focused solely on SWIFT. This is somewhat understandable, since that is the Big Story. But it’s not the whole story.

As the original article mentioned:

Officials described the Swift program as the biggest and most far-reaching of several secret efforts to trace terrorist financing. Much more limited agreements with other companies have provided access to ATM transactions, credit card purchases and Western Union payments, the officials said.

Slightly more information about these “agreements” with other companies was provided much deeper in the long article, with a few details about one involving Western Union and its parent company.

[Following 9/11,] Financial company executives, many of whom had lost friends at the World Trade Center, were eager to help federal officials trace terrorist money. “They saw 9/11 not just as an attack on the United States, but on the financial industry as a whole,” said one former government official.

Quietly, counterterrorism officials sought to expand the information they were getting from financial institutions. Treasury officials, for instance, spoke with credit card companies about devising an alert if someone tried to buy fertilizer and timing devices that could be used for a bomb, but they were told the idea was not logistically possible, a lawyer in the discussions said.

The FBI began acquiring financial records from Western Union and its parent company, the First Data Corporation. The programs were alluded to in Congressional testimony by the FBI in 2003 and described in more detail in a book released this week, “The One Percent Doctrine,” by Ron Suskind. Using what officials described as individual, narrowly framed subpoenas and warrants, the FBI has obtained records from First Data, which processes credit and debit card transactions, to track financial activity and try to locate suspects.

Similar subpoenas for the Western Union data allowed the FBI to trace wire transfers, mainly outside the United States, and to help Israel disrupt about a half-dozen possible terrorist plots there by unraveling the financing, an official said.

Subpoenas — sounds good, right? Well, it would except for the fact that these were not subpoenas as you and I typically think of them. No judge reviewed them, there was no court hearing, no just cause was argued.

Rather, these were (are still) what are called “administrative subpoenas” or, more specifically, National Security Letters. This is a Constitutionally dubious legal device, first created in limited form in 1978 then expanded enormously by the USA PATRIOT Act, that literally empowers the executive branch to write its own subpoenas with zero — zero — court approval or review. What’s more, anyone receiving a National Security Letter (NSL) is prohibited from saying anything whatsoever about it, even that they received one. Everything about an NSL is a secret. They are nothing more or less than secret warrants issued with impunity by the President and his political appointees, with zero due process or independent oversight.

According to a 2005 story in the Washington Post, citing anonymous government sources, the FBI issues approximately 30,000 National Security Letters every year. You can learn more about the ongoing controversy surrounding NSLs at the ACLU web site, and many others.

Aaanyway…please note that the story so far has dealt with SWIFT and Western Union and its parent, First Data Corporation.  The excerpt above from the NY Times story would appear to indicate they have information about additional financial data mining ops involving other companies and financial institutions.

…And by the way, does anyone else here remember the TIA data mining program and how Congress passed a law expressly prohibiting it?

05.21.06

Federal Sources Confirm US Spying on Reporters

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT at 7:06 pm by Spencer

The Feds are targeting reporters who broke stories about politically damaging and illegal acts by US intelligence.

Following below is a compile of three relevant stories, including independent (albeit second hand) confirmation from Vincent Cannistraro, former CIA chief of counterterrorism who is now in the private sector (nudge nudge). Click the titles for the original sources. You should also read (and/or listen to) Amy Goodman’s interview with targeted ABC News journalist Brian Ross. You might also be interested to read about similar experiences by the Capitol Hill Blue blog.

Federal Source to ABC News: We Know Who You’re Calling

The Blotter, ABC News blog
May 15, 2006 10:33 AM

Brian Ross and Richard Esposito Report:

A senior federal law enforcement official tells ABC News the government is tracking the phone numbers we (Brian Ross and Richard Esposito) call in an effort to root out confidential sources.

“It’s time for you to get some new cell phones, quick,” the source told us in an in-person conversation.

ABC News does not know how the government determined who we are calling, or whether our phone records were provided to the government as part of the recently-disclosed NSA collection of domestic phone calls.

Other sources have told us that phone calls and contacts by reporters for ABC News, along with the New York Times and the Washington Post, are being examined as part of a widespread CIA leak investigation.

One former official was asked to sign a document stating he was not a confidential source for New York Times reporter James Risen.

Our reports on the CIA’s secret prisons in Romania and Poland were known to have upset CIA officials. The CIA asked for an FBI investigation of leaks of classified information following those reports.

People questioned by the FBI about leaks of intelligence information say the CIA was also disturbed by ABC News reports that revealed the use of CIA predator missiles inside Pakistan.

Under Bush Administration guidelines, it is not considered illegal for the government to keep track of numbers dialed by phone customers.

The official who warned ABC News said there was no indication our phones were being tapped so the content of the conversation could be recorded.

A pattern of phone calls from a reporter, however, could provide valuable clues for leak investigators.

ABC Claims Government Traced Its Reporters’ Calls

BY JOSH GERSTEIN
New York Sun
May 16, 2006

ABC News claimed yesterday that phone calls made by its reporters and journalists at the New York Times and Washington Post are being traced by the federal government as part of an investigation into leaks of classified information.

In a blog posting, the network said two of its reporters, Richard Esposito and Brian Ross, were told by an unnamed senior federal official that the government had obtained records of calls placed by the two men. The network said the probe may be focused on leaks about a CIA program to detain terrorism suspects at secret locations outside America, but could also involve the network’s reports on the spy agency’s use of missile-firing Predator drones in Pakistan.

ABC did not assert that its reporters’ conversations were being listened in on, but solely that the government had obtained information on whom reporters were calling.

A former counterterrorism chief at the CIA, Vincent Cannistraro, told The New York Sun yesterday that FBI sources have confirmed to him that reporters’ calls are being tracked as part of the probe. “The FBI is monitoring calls of a number of news organizations as part of this leak investigation,” Mr. Cannistraro, who has worked as a consultant for ABC, said “It is going on. It is widespread and it may entail more than those three media outlets.”

Under longstanding Justice Department regulations, prosecutors who subpoena a journalist’s phone records are required to notify the reporter involved within 90 days of obtaining the records. The regulations state that, in most cases, subpoenas should not be issued until after an attempt is made to negotiate access with the reporter.

Spokeswomen for ABC and the Times said their organizations had received no official notification of the effort to seek their phone records. The Washington Post did not respond to a call seeking comment for this article.

The executive director of the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press, Lucy Dalglish, said the government’s reported acquisition of journalists’ calling records was part of a pattern of intrusions on First Amendment rights by the Bush administration. “I’m ready to throw my arms up in the air,” she said. “If there was a subpoena, they are supposed to be notified.”

Investigators could obtain records of calls from government phones without any subpoenas, Ms. Dalglish observed.

An FBI spokesman, Bill Carter, called the ABC report “misleading,” but did not dispute that journalists’ phone records have been obtained by his agency. “In any case where the records of a private person are sought, they may only be obtained through established legal process,” he said.

One ambiguity the Justice Department may be exploiting is that the regulations, adopted in 1980, refer to trial and grand jury subpoenas. ABC suggested yesterday that its records may have been obtained without going through the courts, but instead by using authority for so-called national security letters contained in an anti-terrorism law passed in 2001, the Patriot Act.

Mr. Carter said the Justice Department guidelines are observed even when seeking national security letters, but he said he was not certain whether the notification provisions were the same in such cases.

The secrecy of the national security letter mechanism could help prosecutors head off court challenges news organizations have brought and sometimes won when prosecutors followed the guidelines.

In 2002, a federal prosecutor, Patrick Fitzgerald, attempted to negotiate with the Times to get copies of its phone records as part of an investigation into a leak that he said resulted in the destruction of evidence by officials at an alleged Islamic charity. The Times refused to cooperate and sued to block disclosure of the records.

A federal judge in Manhattan, Robert Sweet, ruled in favor of the newspaper and blocked any subpoenas. The government’s appeal of that decision is pending before the 2nd Circuit.

FBI Acknowledges: Journalists’ Phone Records are Fair Game

The Blotter, ABC News blog
May 16, 2006 12:25 PM

Brian Ross and Richard Esposito Report:

The FBI acknowledged late Monday that it is increasingly seeking reporters’ phone records in leak investigations.

“It used to be very hard and complicated to do this, but it no longer is in the Bush administration,” said a senior federal official.

The acknowledgement followed our blotter item that ABC News reporters had been warned by a federal source that the government knew who we were calling.

The official said our blotter item was wrong to suggest that ABC News phone calls were being “tracked.”

“Think of it more as backtracking,” said a senior federal official.

But FBI officials did not deny that phone records of ABC News, the New York Times and the Washington Post had been sought as part of a investigation of leaks at the CIA.

In a statement, the FBI press office said its leak investigations begin with the examination of government phone records.

“The FBI will take logical investigative steps to determine if a criminal act was committed by a government employee by the unauthorized release of classified information,” the statement said.

Officials say that means that phone records of reporters will be sought if government records are not sufficient.

Officials say the FBI makes extensive use of a new provision of the Patriot Act which allows agents to seek information with what are called National Security Letters (NSL).

The NSLs are a version of an administrative subpoena and are not signed by a judge. Under the law, a phone company receiving a NSL for phone records must provide them and may not divulge to the customer that the records have been given to the government.

03.18.06

NSA Domestic Snooping Resources

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT at 11:10 pm by Spencer

The Center for Democracy and Technology has posted a mother lode of NSA Domestic Snooping Resources — links to relevant laws, myriad Bush Administration documents, legal documents and memos, editorials and op-eds, and more.  Go get edjamacated.

03.05.06

Able Danger Operatives Sue DOD

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT at 5:58 pm by Spencer

As reported by the Minneapolis Star-Tribune on March 4, Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and J.D. Smith, members of the top-secret Able Danger data mining operation, have filed suit against the Dept. of Defense, the Army, and the DIA for denying them access to their attorneys during testimony before Congress.

Shaffer is a Bronze Star recipient and was assigned to the DIA at the time. Following his public disclosure of Able Danger, which included efforts to inform the 9/11 Commission about the program, Shaffer’s security clearance was revoked, allegedlt for “personal and financial improprieties.” He maintains the revocation was in fact in retribution for his disclosures.

Smith is a former Indiana state trooper who was working for defense contractor Orion Scientific Systems when he joined Able Danger.

The suit also alleges that three years after Able Danger was shut down, “the DIA improperly destroyed Able Danger and other files that Shaffer had maintained in his DIA workspace.”
According to the Star-Tribune’s report, “The lawsuit also chronicles attempts by Shaffer and [Able Danger team leader Navy Capt. Scott] Phillpott to tell the Sept. 11 commission about their earlier findings, including an alleged meeting between Shaffer and the panel’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, in Bagram, Afghanistan, in October 2003. The commission’s final report in July 2004 didn’t mention Able Danger.”

The significance of Able Danger is that it had identified three of the 9/11 hijackers (including leader Mohammed Atta) as being part of an Al Qaida cell operating inside the US, contradicting the central finding of the Commission that US intelligence had zero foreknowledge about the plot or its members.
Following categorical denials from the Pentagon concerning Able Danger, Captain Phillpott confirmed its existence and Schaffer’s core claims about it. Phillpott is not a party to the law suit.

01.29.06

The Dept. of Justice White Paper on NSA Domestic Spying Authority

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT at 2:02 pm by Spencer

A central part of the Bush Admin’s current PR blitz to counteract the mounting scandal over domestic spying by the NSA is a white paper released by the Dept. of Justice detailing the administration’s legal justifications for the president’s (alleged) authority to order domestic surveillance without a warrant.

It took about a week, but the thing has finally started showing up online. Now you can read it for yourself. Here’s the links, plus some related materials:

Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President
(Dept. of Justice, Jan. 19, 2006) PDF, 262kb — also archived at EPIC.org

DOJ “Letter of Transmission” for the white paper
(DOJ: Atty. Gen. Gonzales to Sen. Bill Frist, Jan. 19, 2006) PDF, 160kb

Speech by Atty. Gen. Gonzales concerning the NSA program
(Georgetown University Law Center, Jan. 24, 2006) — also at: Univ. of Georgetown (PDF), and the DOJ site

What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation
Remarks by Gen. Michael Hayden (National Press Club, Jan. 23, 2006) — also at Cryptome.
Gen. Hayden is currently the deputy director of National Intelligence and is former director of the NSA

The DOJ white paper was prepared largely in response to a report issued by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. Here’s that as well:

Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 5, 2006)

Of related interest:

Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 18, 2006)

01.24.06

Newly Declassified NSA Docs Confirm Gulf of Tonkin Fraud

Posted in News of the World, ELINT, History at 10:17 pm by Spencer

On December 1, 2005, the National Security Agency (NSA) declassified a batch of 140 top secret documents related to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964.

In case you had forgotten, it was this incident that directly prompted the US Congress to pass the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting President Lyndon Johnson the authority to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” and “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” until “the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured”.

Put simply, this was the allegedly unprovoked attack on US ships that formally started the Vietnam War. To be sure, the US had been militarily involved in Vietnam well before, beginning during the Kennedy Administration, but it was the Gulf of Tonkin that triggered the full-scale war that effectively torpedoed two presidents in a row.

(Other declassified US documents irrutably show — Oliver Stone naysayers notwithstanding — that, at the end of this life, JFK was in fact beginning a significant draw-down of forces and “advisors” in Vietnam. Within just a few days of his assassination, his secret orders were countermanded. In fact, the key document in question, in its declassified version, is covered with handwritten notes, crossed-out phrases, and even a section of retyped text stapled over the original text. I have at least skimmed over microfiche copies of declassified National Security Decision Directives and their equivalents from every administration from Truman through Bush I; this is the only document ever released to be given this treatment. ..and yes, I have to photocopies to prove it. But I digress!)

The entire national tragedy of the Vietnam War thus pivots on the Gulf of Tonkin and what did or did not happen there in the first week of August, 1964. Central to the American causus belli was a purported second attack on US ships on August 4. The ships in question were spy ships run by the National Security Agency. There have been persistent allegations, beginning just a few weeks after, that something was fishy about the attacks, that perhaps things may have been exaggerated in order to provide the US government with the perfect rationale for full scale war.

In the intervening decades, evidence to that effect has mounted. This latest declassification — prised from the most reluctant maw of the NSA — pretty much closes the case for all but the most staunchly dissociative.

To wit: an article by historian Robert J. Hanyok published in a 2001 issue of the NSA’s secret internal journal, Cryptologic Quarterly. As explained by the National Security Archive (a private and completely unrelated non-profit operation) [with bold emphases added here by me]:

Hanyok’s article, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964″ […] provides a comprehensive SIGINT-based account “of what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin.” Using this evidence, Hanyok argues that the SIGINT [signals intelligence — i.e. electronic intercepts] confirms that North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. destroyer, the USS Maddox, on August 2, 1964, although under questionable circumstances. The SIGINT also shows, according to Hanyok, that a second attack, on August 4, 1964, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on U.S. ships, did not occur despite claims to the contrary by the Johnson administration. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara treated Agency SIGINT reports as vital evidence of a second attack and used this claim to support retaliatory air strikes and to buttress the administration’s request for a Congressional resolution that would give the White House freedom of action in Vietnam.

Hanyok further argues that Agency officials had “mishandled” SIGINT concerning the events of August 4 and provided top level officials with “skewed” intelligence supporting claims of an August 4 attack. “The overwhelming body of reports, if used, would have told the story that no attack occurred.” Key pieces of evidence are missing from the Agency’s archives, such as the original decrypted Vietnamese text of a document that played an important role in the White House’s case. Hanyok has not found a “smoking gun” to demonstrate a cover-up but believes that the evidence suggests “an active effort to make SIGINT fit the claim of what happened during the evening of 4 August in the Gulf of Tonkin.” Senior officials at the Agency, the Pentagon, and the White House were none the wiser about the gaps in the intelligence. Hanyok’s conclusions have sparked controversy among old Agency hands but his research confirms the insight of journalist I.F. Stone, who questioned the second attack only weeks after the events. Hanyok’s article is part of a larger study on the National Security Agency and the Vietnam War, “Spartans in Darkness,” which is the subject of a pending FOIA request by the National Security Archive.

On a related note, here is a 2004 analysis by Walter Cronkite for NPR about the Gulf of Tonkin incident through the lens of the intervening 40 years and, apparently, some previously undisclosed insider knowledge ol’ Walt had at the time.

01.08.06

Interview with NSA Whistleblower Russell Tice

Posted in News of the World, Spooks, ELINT, Politics at 8:52 pm by Spencer

Transcript of a Jan. 7, 2006 Democracy Now! interview with Russell Tice.

[In late December, 2005,] “a former N.S.A. intelligence officer publicly announced he wants to testify before Congress. His name is Russell Tice. For the past two decades he has worked in the intelligence field, both inside and outside of government, most recently with the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was fired in May 2005, after he spoke out as a whistleblower.

In his letter, Tice wrote, quote, ‘It’s with my oath as a U.S. intelligence officer weighing heavy on my mind that I wish to report to Congress acts I believe are unlawful and unconstitutional. The freedom of the American people cannot be protected when our constitutional liberties are ignored and our nation has decayed into a police state.’”

When asked by host Amy Goodman why he was now publicly coming forward, he said one reason was “there was a certain roadblock that was sort of lifted that allowed me to do this, and I can’t explain, but I will to Congress if allowed to.”

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